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Active authentication is the practice of continuously verifying the identity of users, based on their context, interactions with a
system, and information provided by that system. In this paper, we investigate if battery charge readings from mobile devices can
be used as an extra factor to improve active authentication. We make use of a large data set of battery charge readings from real
users and construct two computationally inexpensive machine learning classifiers to predict if a user session is authentic: the first
one only based on the battery charge at a certain time of day; the second one predicts the authenticity of the user session when a
previous, recent battery charge reading is available. Our research shows that a simple two-figure battery charge value can make a
useful albeit minor contribution to active authentication.
1. Introduction
Mobile devices allow users to access online information
resources and services anywhere, anytime, and anyhow. A
cornerstone to secure access to these resources and services is
effective user authentication. Several methods are available to
authenticate a user to a remote system.Themost well-known
username and password authentication is still widely used
due to its low cost and ease of implementation. However, this
authentication method exhibits some severe security threats,
such as password reuse on different services, easily guess-
able passwords, leaking passwords, or even entire password
databases leaking from badly implemented online systems.
State-of-practice multifactor authentication [1] combines
inherence, possession, and knowledge factors, that is, some-
thing the user is, has, and knows, leveraging hardware tokens,
smart cards or biometric devices [2] to strengthen authenti-
cation, but such solutions are often perceived as cumbersome
or too expensive to roll out to users.
In this work, we investigate to what extent information
provided by mobile information systems themselves can
be leveraged as additional authentication factors to address
some of the above security threats.
The focus of our work is on multifactor authentication
with the objective to offer user-friendly means of authenti-
cation, that is, beyond typing passwords on small or inconve-
nient user interfaces, using the capabilities of amobile device.
The goal is not an enhanced smart device locking feature
that would protect resources on the device itself, although
this would also be feasible with the techniques presented in
this paper, but rather having the ability with a mobile device
to securely authenticate an individual against an online web
application or service that is usually protected by an identity
and access management system (such as ForgeRock’s Ope-
nAM [3]). The challenges we aim to address are twofold: (1)
how can we first conveniently and reliably authenticate the
identity of a user and (2) how canwe then continuously assess
the confidence in the user’s identity during the application
session. Indeed, in the past decade we have observed a grow-
ing interest in Active Authentication, also known as Context-
aware [4], Continuous [5], or Implicit [6] Authentication.
These authentication systems try to use information about the
user’s context or the user’s behavior [7, 8] within that context
to assess the likelihood of an authentic user session. The
proliferation of mobile devices and the resulting abundance
of new sensors carried by users have fueled a renewed interest
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Figure 1: Integrating battery-based fingerprinting for multifactor authentication in contemporary identity and access management systems.
in the idea of being able to authenticate a user, simply by
her context and interactions with the device. As depicted in
Figure 1, the features provided by the mobile device are then
continuously and seamlessly leveraged as additional authen-
tication factors to validate (1) the user’s identity and (2) the
user’s session.
One criticismof behavior-based authentication systems is
that, similar to biometric authentication, the authentication
material cannot be revoked. However, in the event of com-
promised behavioral data, privacy requirements will typically
allow the user to revoke the use of “behaviometrics” at the
expense of usability. An alternative solution is to split the
computation using cryptographic schemes, such as secure
multiparty computation [9] or homomorphic encryption
[10], for privacy preservingmachine learning. However, from
a practical point of view, such solutionsmight be too resource
demanding for the mobile client device and effectively jeop-
ardize the effectiveness of using battery charge values as a
behaviometric.
A common approach to realize active authentication is to
employ a risk-basedmethodology [11, 12]: an existing authen-
tication technology is used for initial authentication, after
which the authenticated session is maintained as long as the
confidence in the authenticity of that session is high. This
results in potentially long lasting sessions; only when the
confidence in the session drops below a certain threshold, the
user is asked to reauthenticate.The choice of the threshold for
reauthentication allows balancing usability with security.
To make predictions on a session’s authenticity, suitable
context features are selected, as well as matching classifiers.
Features are measurable properties of the system and of the
user’s interaction with the system. Classifiers are algorithms
that map the input of one or more features to a prediction
into classes, such as {𝑎𝑢𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑐, 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑑}, typically after
training the classifier with real (historical) data. Examples
of features that can be used for classification are location
[6, 13, 14], other devices nearby, application usage [13],
telephone calls placed and received [6, 14], websites browsed
and network traffic [15], stylometry [13], keystroke dynamics
[16–19], ambient sound [20], and gait recognition [21, 22].
In active authentication, typically one context feature and its
matching classifier are not sufficient to reliably predict the
authenticity of a user session. Instead, multiple features and
classifiers are considered, and their decision is fused to obtain
acceptable error rates.
In this paper, we investigate if mobile device battery
chargemeasurements can be used as a feature contributing to
predictions for session authenticity. To the best of our knowl-
edge, no one has studied the use of battery charge data as a
novel information source for active authentication. Battery
charge is an interesting information property, since its value
is largely determined by the user’s use of the mobile device
and therefore constitutes a user behavior fingerprint. In that
sense, behavioral authentication factors (or behaviometrics)
are closely related to inherence or biometric factors. Whereas
the latter are unique features that reflect the person you are,
the former tries to distinguish a user based on something you
do.
The advantage of using battery charge information as
a behaviometric factor is that biometric factors, such as
fingerprints, voice, or iris patterns, usually require additional
hardware. While some mobile devices do have fingerprint
scanners, this feature is not yet ubiquitously available. Addi-
tionally, fingerprint scanners are cumbersome to the end-
user.They are impractical for continuous authentication, and
rather privacy sensitive as a user cannot retract his finger-
prints in a way he can change his password if needed. Using
battery charge information as a behaviometric does not have
these drawbacks. Furthermore, it is a feature which can easily
be obtained: Native apps can usually query this value and
web applications can obtain a mobile device’s battery charge
without the user’s knowledge through the HTML5 draft Bat-
tery Status API, which (at the time of writing) is available in
the Chrome and FireFox browsers. Battery charge is therefore
a convenient feature to add to an active authentication system,
thereby decreasing the overall error rate of such a system.
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To ascertain and validate the authenticity of the user’s
digital identity and session, we investigate two novel binary
classifiers based on battery charge measurements as a source
of behavioral information:
(1) User identity: the first classifier is based onhistograms,
used to estimate the probability for a given user to
detect a particular battery charge at a particular time
of the day.
(2) User session: the second classifier is using a stored
recent battery charge measurement to assess the like-
lihood of measuring a particular battery charge after
a certain time interval.
These classifiers are both computationally and storage-wise
inexpensive and scale well for large numbers of users.We also
explore the use of kernel density estimators as well as other
conventional machine learning algorithms which may clas-
sify more accurately at the cost of being more computation-
ally intensive compared to our histograms. Fortunately, these
techniques and algorithms can be parallelised to run on sev-
eralmachines if need be.This is a key advantagewhenever the
data and risk analysis must be carried out for multiple users
in parallel on the authentication platform, rather than on
the mobile device. Indeed, only the authentication platform
(on the server side) is able to analyze, process, and compare
the behavioral data of all its registered users and devices.
To obtain battery charge data from real users, we explored
existing data sets such as Carat [23, 24] and the data set
collected by the Device Analyzer Android App for large-scale
mobile data collection [25]. The usefulness of Carat for our
research turned out to be limited due to insufficient informa-
tion about battery charge levels, as well as lacking timestamps
and unique identifiers per user.We carried out our evaluation
on 28 days of battery charge measurements of 645 devices
from the Device Analyzer Dataset. While it was possible for
some devices to tap into months of battery charge measure-
ments, we limit the period onwhichwe train the classification
algorithms, therefore allowing real-life implementation to use
a sliding window approach to collecting training data. This
way, our solution can handle changing user behavior without
affecting the user.
From a practical point of view, our solution only needs a
few battery charge measurements to become useful. When a
particular value is known at a given point in time, our algo-
rithms can ascertain the likelihood that a certain measure-
ment is genuineminutes later during authentication by taking
into consideration the physical limitations on the maximum
charging and discharging rate of a mobile phone. Once more
measurements are collected, the likelihood can be further
tuned tomatch the specific behavior of the user, both in terms
of obtaining a genuine measurement at any given time of the
day and when a recent prior battery charge measurement is
known. Depending on the mobile phone usage, our solution
typically needs to collect a few days of data before it becomes
effective.
Last but not least, we also evaluate possible security
threatswith respect to using battery information as a behavio-
metric for authentication purposes. Indeed, we must avoid
having awell-informed attacker being able to impersonate the
user by observing his behavior, as well as even ascertain the
possibility of an attacker to reliably predict and subsequently
spoof the battery charge at any moment in time without any
further information.
The key contributions of this work are (1) two classifiers
for predicting identity and session authenticity based on
battery draining and charging behavior, (2) the confirmation
that battery charge measurements can contribute to active
authentication systems, and (3) a practical integration into a
state-of-practice identity and access management platform.
We have integrated our solution in OpenAM (https://
www.forgerock.com/platform/identity-management/) 13, a
contemporary identity and access management system. Ope-
nAM offers device fingerprinting and matching capabilities
using client-side and server-side JavaScript technology. As
shown in our previous work [26], the built-in fingerprinting
code is not well suited for mobile devices. In this work, we
adapted the JavaScript code to call our service to process
battery data. The additional benefit of this integration (illus-
trated in Figure 1) is that OpenAM and our solution can be
independently scaled out.
After reviewing related work in Section 2, we describe
our approach to collecting real user’s data and building usable
classifiers in Section 3. In Section 4, we evaluate the proposed
classifiers and discuss the results of our experimental evalua-
tion. We formulate conclusions and topics for future work in
Section 5.
2. Related Work
Several studies have investigated the concept of Active
Authentication, using various different sources of informa-
tion, like app usage [13], stylometry [13], keystroke dynamics
[16–18, 27, 28], mouse movement [27], smart phone touch
screen dynamics [29–31], phone calls placed [6, 14], GPS
location [6, 13, 14], ambient sound [20], and so forth.We refer
to an extensive survey on behavioral biometrics [32] for a
detailed comparison of accuracy rates when verifying users
with different behavioral biometric approaches.
Traore et al. [27] combined keystroke dynamics and
mouse movement and showed that they can be used for risk-
based authentication on a web page.
To the best of our knowledge, no one has studied the use
of battery charge data as a behavioral information source for
active authentication. Furthermore, most studies are based
on information that must be harvested by a dedicated app on
the mobile device, while (similarly to [27, 33]) our work can
also be used (through the HTML5 draft Battery Status API)
by web services without requiring any dedicated monitoring
software on the mobile device.
One can construct a more accurate classifier and improve
the confidence in a particular user session by fusing the out-
put of different features and their individual classifiers. Frid-
man et al. [13] studied the combination of several different
behavioral context elements, selecting suitable classifiers for
each of them and combining their decision outputs using
Chair and Varshney’s [34] Optimal Fusion Rule, to combine
the decisions of multiple detectors [1], minimizing the overall
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error probability [35]. Bailey et al. [36] used Ensemble Based
Decision Level (EBDL) fusion to combine classifiers for key-
board, mouse, and GUI interaction features and concluded
that EBDL fusion significantly outperformed each individual
modality as well as feature fusion.
Preuveneers and Joosen [37] presented a contextual
authentication framework built upon an existing identity and
access management platform (OpenAM 11). They used IP
address range, geolocation, time of access, and a number
of user agent fingerprints (language, color depth, screen
resolution, etc.).
In a paper by Olejnik et al. [38], battery capacity is used
to fingerprint mobile devices. However, the focus of this
research was not on battery usage as a behavior fingerprint,
but on battery capacity as a device fingerprint, which is
not suitable for authentication purposes (since it can easily
be obtained and then replayed by an adversary to falsely
impersonate a user), as illustrated in our previous work [26]
on the use of device and browser fingerprints [39] for authen-
tication.We also believe that web browser manufacturers can
easily modify the estimated device capacity to be less unique
without affecting usefulness of the Battery Status API, while
this is much less likely for the battery charge percentage,
which we use in this work.
Our work goes beyond the state of the art by researching
the applicability of battery charge information as a (weak)
behaviometric, both as a means for authenticating the user’s
identity and as a continuous assessment of the confidence of
a user’s identity during the application session.The advantage
of our proposal is that relevant information is readily available
and accessible, even within a browser context by tapping
into the HTML 5 Battery Status API. Compared to the
related work, this behaviometric does not require any explicit
user interaction, and is therefore much more convenient to
leverage.
3. Methodology
The goal of this work is to investigate the usefulness of bat-
tery charge information for active authentication. A typical
scenario might be that of a user who consults a website using
her mobile phone (also see Figure 1). As part of the authen-
tication mechanism, the website can request the current
battery charge level from themobile device, using theHTML5
draft Battery Status API. This information (merged with
several other authentication elements) can then be used by
the website to verify the authenticity of the user.
The approach to establishing the user’s identity can be
twofold: Firstly, the website can use a classifier that uses the
battery charge at a certain time of the day as a feature to
predict if this is the expected user. Secondly, if another battery
charge reading was recently collected by the same website,
then a different classifier can be built, predicting the likeli-
hood of the user session to be authentic. Clearly, a mobile
device that was reporting a battery charge of 20% is very
unlikely to be reporting 95% battery charge only 20 minutes
later. By keeping track of how battery charges are distributed
throughout the day, we can ascertain not only whether a par-
ticular battery charge is likely or not for a particular user or
device, but also if that measurement is probable or even tech-
nically feasible given a previous battery charge measurement
for that same device.
We call the first classifier, based on the battery charge at
a certain time of the day the User Verification Classifier. It is
presented in Section 3.2. The second classifier, which uses a
battery charge and another, recently collected battery charge
from the same device, 𝑡 minutes earlier, is called the User
Session Classifier and is presented in Section 3.3.
The overall methodology of our active authentication
solution is as follows.The enrollment of new users starts with
an on-boarding phase in which the user registers his mobile
device to the authentication platform. In our solution, we
build on top of ForgeRock’s OpenAM authentication plat-
form (see Figure 1). This way, both users and mobile devices
have a unique identity. Using its push authentication mech-
anism, the OpenAM platform can interact with the mobile
device in the background to collect any behavioral informa-
tion, including battery charge information. An alternative is
to have amobile application continuously collect and forward
behavioral data to the OpenAM authentication platform.
By leveraging statistical features in the collected data and
machine learning techniques, we build a profile for each
user and his mobile device that characterizes the former’s
interaction behavior by tapping into the battery consumption
of themobile device.This profile is continuously updated, and
significant deviations from this profile may indicate that the
device (or the person using the device) is not genuine.
3.1. Battery Charge Data Acquisition. To study the feasibility
of using device battery data for authentication purposes,
actual battery data is needed from mobile devices used by
real users. Several methods are available to collect this battery
data: it can be obtained by a native application on the mobile
or by adding JavaScript code to web pages of an existing, fre-
quently usedweb service.Using theHTML5draftBattery Sta-
tus API, a device’s battery charge can be queried and recorded
for all users visiting the web pages. Contrary to a native appli-
cation on the mobile, the web page will not be able continu-
ously collect battery information at runtime, as it only oper-
ates from within a browser context whenever the user visits
the instrumented web page. While the training phase needs
sufficient data to build an accurate model to avoid bias in the
measurements as well as a lack of information in particular
circumstances, we only need occasional samples during the
testing phase to analyze the confidence in the user’s identity,
making the HTML5 Battery Status API a perfect candidate
for a practical realization in a concrete online application.
For training purposes, a dedicated device monitoring app
can be installed, which will record the device’s battery charge
with regular intervals. We opted for the latter solution and
made use of theDeviceAnalyzer data set, whichwas collected
by the University of Cambridge [25]. It contains over 100
billion records of Android smartphone and tablet usage from
over 20,000 devices across the globe (http://deviceanalyzer.cl
.cam.ac.uk), collected from volunteers who installed an
Android app, which gives them insights in their own usage
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data in return. We filtered a subset of this data, based on the
following criteria:
(i) A device has at least 28 consecutive days of battery
charge measurements.
(ii) These measurements are collected in intervals of less
than 15 minutes.
In total, 645 mobile devices were retained, of which we used
the last 28 days of battery data recorded.
3.2. User Verification Classifier: Histogram-Based Classifica-
tion on Battery Data. In this first classifier, we will try to use
solely the reported battery charge at a particular time of the
day to predict if a user session is authentic.
For each user, we construct a classifier for classification of
the battery charge 𝐶 at time 𝑡 into two classes: the first class
(𝐻1) is trained on the battery chargemeasurements andmea-
surement times for the valid user and the second class (𝐻0) is
trained on the charge measurements andmeasurement times
of all users.
As a simple binary classifier, we determine the maximum
likelihood of finding charge 𝐶 at time 𝑡 (as a minute-of-the-
day offset) for the valid user or for the average user:
𝐻∗ = 𝐻𝑖 | argmax
𝑖∈{0,1}
𝑃 (𝐶𝑡 | 𝐻𝑖) . (1)
Differently put, we estimate the user session of user 𝑢 to
be valid, when the probability 𝑃𝑢(𝐶𝑡) for this user of finding
battery charge𝐶 at time 𝑡 is higher than the probability 𝑃(𝐶𝑡)
of finding battery charge 𝐶 at time 𝑡 for the average user.
To estimate these probabilities, we create a battery his-
togram matrix 𝐵𝑢𝑖,𝑗 for each user 𝑢. Each measurement 𝑚 =
(𝑚𝐶, 𝑚𝑡) in the collection of measurements 𝑀𝑢 for user 𝑢
is tallied into a 101 × 1440 matrix, providing 101 charge
slots (for charges recorded from 0%, . . . , 100% in one percent
increments in one dimension and 1440 minute per day slots
for the other dimension):
𝐵𝑢𝑖,𝑗 = ∑
𝑚∈𝑀𝑢
𝛿𝑖,𝑚𝐶𝛿𝑗,𝑚𝑡 , (2)
where 𝑚𝑡 is the time of the measurement represented in
minutes since midnight and 𝛿𝑖,𝑗 is the Kronecker delta.
Then, we normalize each of the columns as follows:
𝐵𝑢𝑖,𝑗 =
𝐵𝑢𝑖,𝑗
∑𝑘 𝐵𝑢𝑘,𝑗
. (3)
For each column (corresponding to minute-of-the-day 𝑗),
the sum of the elements for all possible charges now equals
∑𝑖 𝐵
𝑢
𝑖,𝑗 = 1 and the matrix element 𝐵
𝑢
𝑖,𝑗 of the normalized
battery histogram matrix therefore contains an estimation of
the probability of finding a charge 𝑖, at minute-of-the-day 𝑗
for user 𝑢, based on past measurements.
We can write the estimated probability of finding a charge
𝐶 at time 𝑡 as follows:
𝑃𝑢 (𝐶 | 𝑡) = 𝐵
𝑢
𝐶,𝑡 (4)
A graphical representation of the probability densities pro-
vided by the normalized battery histogram is shown in
Figure 2(a). The red cells indicate high probability and the
blue and purple cells indicate low probability for finding a
particular battery charge at a particular time slot.
Each of the columns in the grids of Figure 2 represents a
histogram for one particular one minute time slot.
To estimate the probability for the invalid class, we create
a normalized global battery histogram for all of the users in
the system:
𝐵𝑖,𝑗 =
∑𝑢∑𝑚∈𝑀𝑢 𝛿𝑖,𝑚𝐶𝛿𝑗,𝑚𝑡
∑𝑢∑𝑘 𝐵𝑢𝑘,𝑗
. (5)
The normalized global battery histogram for our mea-
surement data is shown in Figure 3.
3.3. User Session Classifier: Histogram-Based Classification on
Battery Data with Known Prior Battery Charges. Similar to
the first classifier, this second classifier too uses histograms
to calculate the probability of a user’s mobile device having a
specific battery charge percentage at a certain time. It differs
from the one proposed in Section 3.2 in that it establishes
the probability of measuring a specific battery charge reading
given another, prior and recent battery charge measurement.
Let 𝑃𝑢(𝐶 | 𝐶
󸀠
𝑡) be the probability of measuring a battery
charge 𝐶 for user 𝑢, 𝑡minutes after a previous battery charge
𝐶󸀠 was recorded.This probability is interesting, because it can
be used to detect hijacked user sessions: Battery charge is a
continuously evolving property, and both the physical prop-
erties of the device and the typical usage patterns of the user
dictate boundarieswithinwhich the battery charge can evolve
during a certain time span. Battery charge readings outside of
these boundaries can be an indication of a compromised user
session. We can estimate the probability 𝑃𝑢(𝐶 | 𝐶
󸀠
𝑡) by using
past battery charge measurements.
Let 𝑈 be the collection of users and𝑀𝑢 the collection of
battery measurement samples for user 𝑢 ∈ 𝑈. Each 𝑚 ∈ 𝑀𝑢
is a (battery charge, time) tuple:𝑚 = (𝑚𝐶, 𝑚𝑡). For each user
𝑢, timespan 𝑡 ∈ {5, 10, 15, 20, . . . , 140}, and initial charge 𝐶󸀠,
we can now create a
𝐷𝑢,𝐶
󸀠
𝐶,𝑡 = ∑
𝑚∈𝑀𝑢
∑
𝑚󸀠∈𝑀𝑢
𝛿𝐶󸀠 ,𝑚󸀠
𝐶
𝛿𝑡,(𝑚𝑡−𝑚󸀠𝑡)𝛿𝐶,𝑚𝐶 (6)
and normalize𝐷𝑢,𝐶
󸀠
𝐶,𝑡 as follows:
𝐷𝑢,𝐶
󸀠
𝐶,𝑡 =
𝐷𝑢,𝐶
󸀠
𝐶,𝑡
∑𝐶󸀠∈{0,...,100}𝐷
𝑢,𝐶󸀠
𝐶󸀠 ,𝑡
(7)
such that
∑
𝐶∈{0,...,100}
𝐷𝑢,𝐶
󸀠
𝐶,𝑡 = 1,
∀𝑢 ∈ 𝑈, 𝐶󸀠 ∈ {0, . . . , 100} , 𝑡 ∈ {0, 5, 10, . . . , 140} .
(8)
𝐷𝑢,𝐶
󸀠
𝐶,𝑡 can now be regarded as an estimation based on past
measurements of the probability𝑃𝑢(𝐶 | 𝐶
󸀠
𝑡) to detect a battery
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Figure 2: Graphical representation of normalized battery histograms, (a) without Gaussian smoothing applied and (b and c) with Gaussian
smoothing applied, with, respectively, 𝜎 = 1.0 and 𝜎 = 5.0.
charge 𝐶 and a timespan 𝑡 after having detected an earlier
battery charge 𝐶󸀠.
The approach is illustrated in Figure 4, which shows the
probability distribution 𝐷𝑢,70𝐶,60 for user 𝑢, for measuring a
particular battery charge 𝐶, 60 minutes after a battery charge
of 70% was measured. In this case, the figure indicates that
the highest probability is at 66%. Clearly, for this user, the
average battery discharge is around 4%per hour.However, we
can also see past records of the battery charge having dropped
down to 48%, presumably when the user had been using the
mobile device heavily. Towards the other side of the charge
axis, we can see recorded charges up to 94%, indicating that
the maximum charging speed for this device is 24%/h.
Figure 5 shows the probability distribution 𝐷𝑢,70𝐶,𝑡 for the
same user 𝑢, for measuring a particular battery charge 𝐶, 𝑡
minutes after a battery charge of 70% was measured.
Using the calculated probability estimations, we can now
create a binary classifier, by choosing a threshold probability
𝜃. The classifier will predict a valid user session, when
𝑃𝑢(𝐶 | 𝐶
󸀠
𝑡) ≈ 𝐷
𝑢,𝐶󸀠
𝐶,𝑡 ≥ 𝜃 and an invalid user session when
𝑃𝑢(𝐶 | 𝐶
󸀠
𝑡) ≈ 𝐷
𝑢,𝐶󸀠
𝐶,𝑡 < 𝜃.
3.4. Threat Model and Attack Vectors. The use of battery
charge measurements as an additional source of information
for multifactor authentication assumes that it is not trivial for
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Figure 3: Graphical representation of the normalized global battery
histogram (Gaussian smoothing 𝜎 = 1 applied).
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Figure 4: Battery charge probability distribution for one of the
devices, 60 minutes after an initial battery charge of 70% was seen.
a malicious adversary to guess and spoof the battery charge
for a particular device on a given time of the day.
In this work, we assume that the adversary is able to
collect data from different devices to compute likely values
throughout the day, possibly by relying on data sets we have
also used for our experiments. This means he is able to
compute the probability distribution of battery charges for
anyminute of the day (as in Figure 3) and can try to spoof the
authentication system by using the most likely battery charge
value. To evaluate the effectiveness of the proposed scheme,
we evaluate the impact of two different types of attacks:
(i) Zero-effort attack: the adversary is simply another
subject in the database that acts as a casual impostor
(ii) Nonzero effort attack: the adversary actively masquer-
ades as someone else by spoofing the battery charge
of the claimed identity
In the zero-effort attack, we use the data of the other
subjects as negative examples for a given user to get insights
into the probability of accidentally authenticating on another
device. For the nonzero effort attack, we assume the adversary
implements a nonpersonalized attack vector that requires
minimal effort to spoof the batterymeasure. In the latter case,
we distinguish between two scenarios: (1) the adversary has
no information from the target’s device, but just a nonper-
sonal probability distribution of battery charges, and (2) the
adversary can exploit previous battery charge information.
4. Evaluation
An important tool for assessing the value of a feature and a
corresponding classifier for active authentication is metrics
that describe the effectiveness of the classifier:
(i) False acceptance rate (FAR): the ratio of the number
of classifications where a nonauthentic user is falsely
accepted as authentic by the classifier over the total
number of classifications performed.
(ii) False rejection rate (FRR): the ratio of the number
of classifications where an authentic user is falsely
rejected by the classifier over the total number of
classifications performed.
(iii) Equal error rate (ERR): in many cases, a classifier’s
FAR can be decreased by modifying the classifier to
be more selective, at the cost of an increasing FRR
and vice versa.This typically allows balancing security
(requiring a low FAR) with usability (requiring a low
FRR). The point where the classifier is tuned to have
a FAR which is equal in value to the FRR is called the
Equal Error Rate.
4.1. Evaluation of the User Verification Classifier
Calculating FAR and FRR. We used the described classifica-
tion method to make predictions on the validity of a user
session, purely based on battery charge and time of day.
For calculating the False Rejection Rate, we used a 4-fold
cross-validation strategy on a per-week basis: One week was
excluded from the training data and set aside to be used for
testing the built model, therefore ensuring the training data
is not used to validate the built model. We then repeated the
test threemore times, each time excluding another week from
the training data and using it to test the model.
Since the (𝑚𝐶, 𝑚𝑡) samples are time series, excluding
random samples in a typical stratified 𝑘-fold cross-validation
strategy would lead to overly optimistic results, since those
testing samples can easily be fitted in the corresponding gaps
in the training data. This is why we chose to exclude large
contiguous blocks from the training data, opting for 4-fold
cross-validation (resulting in blocks of one week), rather than
the standard 10-fold cross-validation.
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Figure 5: Battery charge probability distribution for one of the tracked devices, in the time after an initial battery charge of 70% was seen.
Table 1: Results of battery histogram classification.
Mean stdev
FAR 0.044 0.025
FRR 0.938 0.039
To calculate the False Acceptance Rate, all measurements
available from all other users were fed to a user’s classifier,
to verify if they were falsely accepted as authentic. While
the user’s classifier does include measurements from all other
users, due to the use of the of the normalized global battery
histogram (as shown in (5)), we believe that thiswill have little
effect on the accuracy of the results, since the global battery
histogram is an average over 645 different users.
The results are provided in Table 1.
The results listed in Table 1 look far from useful:The False
Acceptance Rate is excellent, but clearly the False Rejection
Rate is abominable. Looking closer at Figure 2(a) reveals that
since the matrices we are using are very fine-grained and
since only 21 days of training data are used, the matrices do
not really indicate a probability; rather they merely contain a
past record of observed samples. To create useful probability
estimations, we can use Kernel Density Estimation with a
suitable bandwidth to estimate underlying probabilities, as
illustrated in Figure 6, where a Gaussian kernel was used and
a bandwidth of 5.0.
However, since the collected samples are already dis-
cretized in percentage charge and minute of the day, using
a Gaussian smoothing algorithm on the battery histograms
will achieve a very similar result, at a performance cost which
is orders of magnitude lower. Instead of a Kernel Density
Estimation bandwidth, we can fine tune the classifier using
the Gaussian blurring standard deviation: for certain applica-
tions, one might be interested in decreasing the FRR (thereby
increasing the usability), at the cost of an increasing FAR
(thereby sacrificing security) or vice versa. Applying Gaus-
sian smoothing with different standard deviations for the
Gaussian kernel to the battery histograms can achieve exactly
this, where we use a standard deviation in the time dimen-
sion, which is 14.4 times larger than the standard deviation
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Figure 6: Using Kernel Density Estimation to build a charge/time
probability model for the device that was shown in Figure 2.
used in the charge dimension, to compensate for the fact that
the probability matrices are 14.4 times more fine-grained in
the time dimension than the charge dimension. For simplicity
of notation, in the remainder of this work, we refer to the
standard deviation of the charge dimension; the standard
deviation in the time dimension should bemultiplied by 14.4.
A graphical representation of the effect of the Gaussian
filter on the battery charge histograms can be observed in
Figures 2(b) and 2(c), where Gaussian kernel standard devi-
ations of 1.0 and 5.0 were used. The results of this approach
on the classification errors are listed in Table 2 and plotted in
Figure 7.
Using linear interpolation on the FAR/FRR curve
between standard deviation 1.4 and 3 yields an Equal Error
Rate of 0.413.
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Table 2: Results of battery histogram classification with a given
Gaussian Smoothing filter.
Smoothing level FFR FAR
Mean stdev Mean stdev
10 0.383 0.111 0.475 0.064
8.0 0.370 0.109 0.466 0.069
6.0 0.366 0.105 0.458 0.062
5.0 0.369 0.103 0.448 0.066
4.0 0.376 0.102 0.439 0.063
3.5 0.382 0.101 0.435 0.061
3.0 0.389 0.100 0.427 0.057
2.5 0.400 0.099 0.420 0.059
2.0 0.415 0.099 0.411 0.056
1.75 0.425 0.099 0.405 0.053
1.5 0.438 0.100 0.396 0.054
1.4 0.444 0.100 0.393 0.050
1.2 0.458 0.100 0.384 0.049
1.0 0.477 0.101 0.374 0.050
0.8 0.501 0.102 0.360 0.050
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Figure 7: False Acceptance versus False Rejection Rates for different
smoothing levels on the user models (indicated in the data labels).
FAR was calculated by feeding 5 random (time, charge) samples
from every known user to the classifier.
Attacker Model. Earlier in this section, we calculated the
FAR by feeding the (charge, time) measurements from all
other users into the proposed first classifier and recording
the number of times the classifier wrongly predicted that this
could be the user we are evaluating.The results of this looked
modest but still useful with an EER of 41.26%, taking into
account the fact that it was achieved only using a 2-figure
battery charge measurement. However, this approach did not
assume an attacker who deliberately tries to circumvent the
active authentication system.A clever attackerwill investigate
which is the most likely battery charge to present to the
authentication system at any given time. We can assume that
the attacker will not have access to the detailed per-user
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Figure 8: False Acceptance versus False Rejection Rates for different
smoothing levels on the user models. FAR was calculated using four
different attack models: (i) using 5 random (time, charge) samples
from every known user (blue line); (ii) using the global probability
estimation to find the most likely charge value at each time of the
day (green line); (iii) the adversary always reporting 100% battery
charge (yellow line); and (iv) using 2500 random samples of other
users having the same mobile device model (orange line).
charge probability histograms; however the Normalized
Global Battery ChargeHistogram𝐵 can be regarded as public
knowledge. It could be used by an attacker to determine the
most likely battery charge for the average user at any given
time of the day. Another likely value to be used by an attacker
would be the 100% charge value, since this is especially in the
morning a very likely battery charge.
Repeating our analysis where instead of feeding mea-
surements from different users into the classifier, we present
the most likely battery charge, and repeating one more
time, presenting invariably the 100% battery charge results in
different FAR/FRR values, as shown in Figure 8.
We observe that in the classifier range with FRR between
0.38 and 0.44 (smoothing standard deviations between 1.4
and 3.5), these targeted attacks on the classifier do not
perform better than a random sample choice. Our hypothesis
is that since the classifier is based on the difference between
the user’s past charge history and the average user’s past
charge history, it works particularly well for distinguishing
average charge data from the target user’s charge data.
Finally, one last attacker model was interesting to con-
sider: one of the core assumptions of this work is that the
battery charge constitutes both a device fingerprint and a
user behavior fingerprint. To investigate how large the impact
of the device was on the classifier, we calculated the False
Acceptance Rate, by picking 2500 random samples from
other users, who used an identical model of mobile device (in
this FAR calculation, sincewe compare to other userswith the
same devicemodel, we dropped the data fromdevicesmodels
that were used only by a single user; therefore, the data
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Table 3: Mean and standard deviation of metrics for different classification algorithms in a zero-effort attack scenario.
Algorithm Accuracy Precision Recall F1 FAR FRR
Mean stdev Mean stdev Mean stdev Mean stdev Mean stdev Mean stdev
LR 0.569 0.079 0.559 0.073 0.591 0.159 0.570 0.107 0.453 0.087 0.408 0.159
DT 0.616 0.074 0.601 0.064 0.688 0.159 0.634 0.095 0.455 0.121 0.311 0.159
RF 0.625 0.075 0.610 0.064 0.684 0.157 0.638 0.097 0.434 0.103 0.315 0.157
GBT 0.627 0.079 0.616 0.068 0.661 0.150 0.633 0.101 0.405 0.085 0.338 0.150
NB 0.523 0.030 0.522 0.030 0.523 0.052 0.522 0.040 0.477 0.025 0.476 0.052
MLP 0.556 0.060 0.556 0.056 0.587 0.261 0.538 0.150 0.474 0.237 0.412 0.261
KNN 0.611 0.069 0.598 0.056 0.657 0.117 0.624 0.081 0.434 0.053 0.342 0.117
of 533 devices (of the total of 645 devices) was used for this
FAR calculation). As can be observed in the orange data
plot of Figure 8, the FAR rate becomes slightly higher, with
an average increase of 0.013, indicating that although the
classifier appears to be measuring mostly a user behavior
fingerprint there is indeed a very small effect of the device
fingerprint present in the classifier.
4.2. Comparison with Conventional ML Classification Algo-
rithms. In this section, we investigate the feasibility of con-
ventional machine learning algorithms to classify battery
charges as either genuine or not. For each of the 645 devices,
we create a separate model that we train on genuine data of
one device and attacker data. For the latter, we implement the
two attack vectors, that is, the zero-effort attack by relying
on data from other subjects and the nonzero effort attack by
attacking with likely battery values.
In Table 3 we list the aggregated results of the following
classification algorithms, that is, logistic regression (LR),
decision trees (DT), random forest (RF), gradient boosted
trees (GBT), naive Bayes (NB), multilayer perceptron (MLP),
and 𝑘-nearest neighbors (KNN). The data sets that have
been used for testing and training are based on 7200 battery
charge measurements of a genuine device and 7200 battery
charge measurements of an attacker (random samples of
other users). For the training data we take 70% of the samples
in the dataset and 30% for the test set. The split is not
random but in time, which means that the test samples have
been collected after the training samples. The motivation
for taking equal amount of genuine device and attacker
samples is that imbalanced training and test datasets would
severely affect the classification accuracy of some machine
learning algorithms (e.g., KNN would favor those classes
with many more samples). For each of the 645 devices, we
constructed the corresponding datasets and computed the
Accuracy, Precision, Recall, F1, False Acceptance Rate, and
False Rejection Rate classification metrics. Table 3 provides
an overview of the mean and standard deviation of these
metrics, showing that the gradient boosted trees classification
algorithm gets the best results in terms of accuracy. The FAR
is around 0.405 which means it is about 10% better compared
to random choice where 50% of test samples would be falsely
accepted.
In Table 4 we show the results of a nonzero free effort
attack where the adversary tries to spoof the battery charge
Table 4: Mean and standard deviation of metrics for different
classification algorithms in two nonzero effort attack scenarios: (1)
the most likely battery charge and (2) a 100% full battery charge.
Algorithm FAR (most likely) FAR (100%)
Mean stdev Mean stdev
LR 0.406 0.333 0.488 0.484
DT 0.462 0.269 0.368 0.304
RF 0.440 0.274 0.351 0.293
GBT 0.406 0.244 0.338 0.282
NB 0.482 0.054 0.465 0.182
MLP 0.472 0.285 0.465 0.364
KNN 0.471 0.207 0.397 0.241
by either (1) selecting the most likely battery charge value
based on previously collected information from many users
or (2) simply using a full battery charge level. Based on the
previous histograms one could conclude that using a 100%
battery charge level would be a good guess, but as the table
shows several classifiers can reject these false attempts.
Also worth noting is that there is a slight difference in the
standard deviation of the above metrics. In case of a large
standard deviation, it means that some targets are easier to
spoof than others. As such, one could use these estimates
as a personal risk indicator whether a battery charge is a
good parameter to use for multifactor authentication on an
individual basis.
From a performance point of view, some of the above
conventional machine learning algorithms might classify
better, but at a significant cost of performance and mem-
ory consumption (at least an order of magnitude higher
compared to our histogram-based approach) which would
make these techniques less feasible for implementation and
deployment on an identity and access management platform
that must handle thousands of users concurrently.
4.3. Evaluation of the User Session Classifier
Calculating FAR and FRR.The second classifier was evaluated
by creating probability histograms, per user, per amount of
time passed since a previously recorded battery charge (with
a resolution of 5min). The histograms record the probability
of recording a battery charge𝐶, given an earlier battery charge
reading 𝐶󸀠, received 𝑡minutes earlier.
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Figure 9: FAR and FRR rates for the User Session, for different
elapsed time periods since last known battery charge. Chosen
threshold 𝜃 = 0.008.
To calculate the False Rejection Rate, we again use a 4-
fold cross-validation approach per measurement day, leaving
out a week of data when training the model and then making
predictions for the week left out of the training data, tallying
the false predictions for valid user data and then repeating
3 more times with different week folds and averaging the
obtained FRR.
To calculate the False Acceptance Rate, we adopted the
attacker model introduced in Section 4.1. The FAR is again
calculated in four different ways:
(i) Using random samples.
(ii) Using themost likely battery charge value for the time
of the day as predicted by the Global Battery Charge
Histogram 𝐵.
(iii) Using consistently 100% battery charge.
(iv) Using battery chargemeasurements taken at the same
time of day by a device identical to that of the user we
try to impersonate.
The FAR and FRR rates were calculated for different time
periods since the user was last seen. The results are shown
in Figure 9. Similarly to the fact that 𝜎 can be used in the
User Verification Classifier to tune the FAR/FRR ratio, the
User Session Classifier FAR/FRR ratio can be fine-tuned by
selecting different threshold values 𝜃, allowing usability to
be balanced by security, or allowing better fine tuning in
an Active Authentication’s fusion algorithm that combines
different classifiers.
As expected, the error rates gradually increase as time
goes by. Past battery measurements which are 60 minutes
stale can be used for predicting session authenticity with a
FRR of 0.273 and a worst-case FAR (the attacker providing
the most likely charge for the time of the day) of 0.332, which
is significantly better than a random guess and therefore
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Figure 10: FAR and FRR rates for User Session Classifier, when
using the average probability histograms, for different elapsed time
periods since last known battery charge. Chosen threshold 𝜃 =
0.012.
suitable as a component for active authentication. A past
battery charge measurement that is 120 minutes old will yield
a FRR of 0.428 and a worst-case FAR of 0.392, which is at the
limit of its usefulness for active authentication.
To obtain these results, we have collected the training
material by monitoring the participants’ mobile devices
battery charge for 28 days at regular time intervals (at least
every 15 minutes). This is a scenario that cannot be used,
for instance, by a website where users are not continuously
connected. In such an application, training the classifier to
learn the charge and discharge behavior for each individual
user may not be realistic.Therefore, we investigated how well
the classification would work, when using a single classifier,
trained on all user data, instead of a unique classifier per user.
The results are shown in Figure 10.
The error rates are slightly higher than when training
for individual users, but still useful: With a past battery
measurement that is 60 minutes old, the FRR is 0.292 and
the worst-case FAR (when the attacker reports 100% battery
charge) is 0.406. Measurements older than 80 minutes have a
FAR above 0.50 and can be considered beyond usefulness for
active authentication.
Since no individual user training is required; this option is
realistically usable for active authentication, for instance, for
websites to detect session hijacking (sessions can be hijacked
in several ways, e.g., by predictable session tokens, cross-site
scripting attacks, and malicious JavaScript code). As long as
the user requests web pages with intervals no longer than
60 minutes, a compromised session could be detected. Many
web sites have a policy to expire sessions after a certain
timeout period, which is often less than 60 minutes.
Interestingly, for both versions of the User Session Clas-
sifier, the FAR when calculated with charge samples from
identical devices follows closely but is slightly lower than the
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FAR calculated with the most likely battery value for the time
of the day. This might be explained by the fact that the most
likely battery charge is calculated overmanymore devices and
therefore represents a better probability estimation than the
samples from identical devices only.
4.4. Discussion. The concept of active authentication is based
on fusing different sensor inputs together, thereby reducing
the total error rate to acceptable levels, both from a usability
point of view (implying a low FRR) and a security point of
view (requiring a low FAR). In this paper, we have studied if
battery charge can be used as one of these sensors. Clearly, the
log2(100) = 6.6 bits of entropy provided by a 2-figure battery
charge reading can impossibly uniquely identify a user;
however, combined with other inputs, battery charge may
be a useful component of an active authentication system,
especially for building a confidence score for estimating
session authenticity.
The first proposed classifier showed an Equal Error Rate
of 41.3%.This is 8.7% better than a random guess and implies
it couldmake a small contribution to an active authentication
system.The fact that the FalseAcceptance and False Rejection
Rates can be tuned is an additional interesting property.
The second classifier is trained on past data, creating a
series of battery charge probability histograms. These his-
tograms present the probability of finding a particular charge
a certain time after a certain earlier charge was observed.This
is a very suitable technique to detect anomalies introduced for
instance by user impersonation or session hijacking where
the adversary does not know the current battery charge of
the user. Stored in binary format, 240,000 bytes would be
sufficient to store this data (assuming 1 byte per charge bucket,
100 × 100 charge buckets per histogram, for 24 time periods).
A classification requires a simple table lookup for the three
dimensions (𝐶, 𝐶󸀠, 𝑡) and comparison to a predetermined
threshold 𝜃. This implies that this system is practically
implementable in authentication systems, in terms of both
performance and data storage required.
Building the histogram tables with past measurements is
straightforward: Although (6) suggests a𝑂(𝑛2) effort with the
size of the measurement data, in fact, for each examined time
period (in our case 24), the collection of measurements is
iterated once,making it an𝑂(𝑛) effort. Itmay not be practical,
however, to build per-user histogram tables, sincemanymea-
surements are required to build accurate histogram tables.
However, our analysis in Section 4.3 showed that the classifier
still performs well when histogram tables are constructed for
classes of users. Therefore, these tables need not be con-
structed by the service providing active authentication ser-
vices but can be harvested from independent research.
5. Conclusions
In this work, we investigated the use of battery information
from mobile devices for multifactor authentication with the
objective to offer user-friendly means of continuous or active
authentication against an online service or application. Bat-
tery charge is an interesting mobile information property, as
its value is largely determined by the user’s use of the mobile
device and therefore constitutes a behavioral fingerprint
that characterizes the user in an implicit way. Furthermore,
harvesting such battery charge data on web pages is simple
through the HTML5 draft Battery Status API.
While other behaviometrics have been proposed in the
literature for authentication purposes, the novelty of this
work is the use of battery charge and discharge behavior as a
new metric. The objective was to quantify the added value of
battery information on its own and to evaluate the resilience
of this behaviometric against zero-effort and nonzero effort
attack vectors.
We proposed a first binary classifier for determining a
user’s authenticity, solely based on battery charge and time of
day.This classifier characterizes the likelihood of a given bat-
tery charge for that particular user (or device).With an Equal
Error Rate of 41.3% (compared to 50% for random guessing
whether the user is authentic or not), we believe the classifier
can bring a small contribution to active authentication.
Indeed, as a two-digit battery charge measurement does not
carry much information, in practice it would be combined
with other parameters to further strengthen continuous mul-
tifactor authentication. Compared to conventional machine
learning algorithms, our classification method performs bet-
ter or has comparable results but at a computationally lower
cost that makes the proposed technique more feasible for
deployment on a large scale where the behavior of mul-
tiple users must be analyzed concurrently. An additional
advantage is that the classifier’s False Rejection Rate and
False Acceptance Rate can be tuned, to balance security with
usability or to meet the requirements of the decision fusion
system typically implemented in an active authentication
system.
We also proposed a complementary second binary clas-
sifier, used to determine session authenticity when a recent
past battery measurement is available. We investigated the
evolution of the False Acceptance Rate and False Rejection
Ratewith the age of the previousmeasurement and concluded
that previous battery measurements of up to 2 hours old can
contribute to active authentication. We also evaluated the
classifier when trained on all user data, eliminating the need
to train classifiers for each individual user, concluding that
measurements of up to 1 hour old can still contribute to active
authentication.
The complementary nature of these binary classifiers
means that they each are able to find different types of anoma-
lies in battery charge measurements depending on the data
that is available on the subject.While both candetect spoofing
attacks in different ways, the second technique performs
better when an attacker is not able to directly collect battery
charge measurements from the mobile device of the targeted
subject and when the authentication system has recently
collected genuine measurements.
In future work we will combine battery charge with
additional authentication features to further validate the
feasibility of active authentication on other battery-powered
devices.
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